

IRISH MONTHLY

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FRANCE AFTER THE ELECTIONS . Jean Dutertre

MEMORY AND MAN . E. F. O'Doherty

CLINICS FOR PROBLEM CHILDREN Sr. Marie Hilda

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
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THE IRISH MONTHLY

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read the pamphlet. The type of apathy which obtains at election times is possibly a contributory factor, but here is a somewhat more factual explanation: the publication of 500 copies took place early in October. Out of this issue more than 200 copies were distributed to members of the Oireachtas together with a small number to the medical consultative council. Without even taking into consideration the number which must have been retained by the Department of Health itself, one can safely say that there were probably not 300 available for sale. As there are considerably more than 2,000 medical practitioners in Eire, the first edition was, therefore, inadequate to meet the demands of even one-sixth of the medical profession before reaching the general public for whom the White Paper was intended. The result was that the publication swiftly disappeared from the bookstalls and no copies were to be had for almost five weeks when the second issue of 750 took place on 4 November. As to whether this gross miscalculation of the public's needs should be attributed to a "printers' error" or a deliberate political subterfuge must be decided by the reader. The fact remains that now (7 Dec.) the document is procurable and should be read by everybody with a sense of duty towards his family. If the present paragraph savours of looking a gift-horse in the mouth, what follows is an attempt to lock the stable door before the animal has gone.

Entitled "Outline of Proposals for the Improvement of the Health Services", the White Paper is divided into four parts. The first, comparatively non-controversial part, deals with the evolution of the Health Services as seen by the Ministry of Health. The second part outlines those existing medical services which are, or which are likely to be, under the Minister's supervision. A passing reference is also made to the part played by the voluntary hospitals and to the principle of private practice in the pattern of our medical system. In this connection appears the rather disturbing statement that hospital and private practice is more concerned with cure than prevention. However true this may be of hospital practice, any reader whose family has undergone routine inoculation by the family doctor against the everyday infections will at once recognise that this charge is either the outcome of Departmental ignorance or else is deliberately mischievous. It is interesting to note that in this section the intentions of the Government towards the voluntary hospitals are frankly set out. "It is," reads the relevant portion, "therefore, apparent that the

scope of voluntary activity tends even at present to be circumscribed by the normal growth of the public services. The field in which these agencies can continue to operate with complete detachment would inevitably be still further narrowed by a wider programme of expansion in the official sphere." This is the first overt reference to the proposed fate of voluntary effort.

Part III is occupied with a résumé of the reformation of medical practice under the Health Act, 1947. These are what are termed the "rationalization" of local administration and "consolidation and modernisation" of health law. The third part of the Health Act provides a free maternity service for women of every financial grade and a free medical attendance on all children up to the age of sixteen, also irrespective of the income of their parents. The district medical officer of the future would be responsible for these services as well as for the education generally of mothers and children in relation to health. The existing dispensary officer would, where suitable and willing to serve, become the first district medical officer in the proposed service. If, however, the authorities considered him incapable of the work, he could be discharged with an unstipulated pension. In addition to supervision by medical inspectors and other medical advisers "it is contemplated that the efficiency of the district medical officers in the performance of their duties will be assessed by the local health councils". Dispensary doctors retained in the service would be obliged to co-operate in case-finding relating to venereal diseases and tuberculosis. For their additional duties they would receive an increase in salary and would be required to "have had post-graduate training in child health, with special reference to the normal child, a Certificate in Public Health and post-graduate training in the practice of obstetrics".

The Act provides a complete code of law aiming at the prevention of the spread of infectious disease and empowers the chief medical officer compulsorily to detain a person who is a probable source of infection and who cannot be effectively isolated in his own home. It also provides in exceptional circumstances that the Minister may declare that all persons of an appropriate class must be immunised. While on the subject of compulsion one may add that compulsory examination of school children is also provided for.

There is then a section calculated to protect the public from food considered to be injurious to health. Amongst the miscellaneous

provisions is one for the setting up of a National Health Council and other special consultative councils, such as that already referred to at the commencement of this article. There is an opportune section dealing with the control of the standard of medical and toilet preparations. The concluding paragraph of this part carries the following important announcement on State Medicine: "Legal and administrative integration of all the services and further widening of their scope is the long-term aim and the Government's proposals to achieve that end are the subject of the concluding part of this White Paper."

The proposals referred to seek to extend the range of the district medical officer's general practitioner attendance beyond what is now termed the public assistance class. Thus, all persons whose income does not exceed £250 per annum and, in the case of farmers, whose income does not exceed this level and where the valuation of whose holding(s) does not exceed £25 per annum, would be entitled to a general practitioner service subject to the payment of an unspecified token sum directly to the district medical officer. Persons whose income falls between £250 and £500 will be, it is suggested, eligible for benefits similar to those for which they would normally be eligible under the recent National Health Insurance legislation to which would be added consultant services. A fee (unstated) for these services would be payable directly to the State.

For the purpose of administration it is proposed to divide the country into three "regions", Dublin, Cork and Galway. These regions would be controlled from the point of view of health services by a regional health authority which would manage all institutions—a term which now legally includes hospitals—and specialist services within the prescribed region. It is proposed that each regional authority would have the services of a regional administrator and a medical adviser. These administrators would from the nature of the text appear to be non-medical and would supervise the admission lists to institutions and the medical records in respect of patients discharged therefrom. Presumably they would also have free access to the confidential reports arising out of the district medical officer's case-finding activities. The foregoing large areas would be subdivided into counties and smaller districts from the point of view of health services. These would be controlled by the local health council acting under the supervision of the Minister for Health.

II

So much then for the general contents which have not, it should be said, been here set out serially so much as selected and grouped about specific ideas. It is clear from the tenor of the publication that the State has finally reached an awareness of the inadequacy of the dispensary service which for so many years has been unsatisfactory alike to the public for which it caters and the doctors whom it employs. More important still, it indicates that official recognition has at last been given to the consideration that, whilst we have an excellent service available for all those who are able to pay for it and an easily remediable medical service for the necessitous, there is imperfect provision under existing conditions for the medical needs of the lower income group. The occurrence of a prolonged illness in the family of the "white collar" class can be a financial catastrophe. Even without considering this extreme contingency, it has long been recognised that there is a large category of people who might possibly be best catered for by, say, a liberal contributory system of medical services.

Whether the suggested State reforms would meet the demand in a way acceptable to all is, of course, open to discussion. The extension of what amounts to something more than dispensary service to persons of income up to £250 and the regional services (exclusive of general practitioner attendance) to the group whose income lies between £250 and £500 might well be acclaimed as a step in the right direction. Before expressing approval, though, one would like to ascertain what the token fee would be to be collected by the district medical officer from persons of the first group and the type of fee to be demanded of the second group by the State. It could be claimed that to fix the qualifying figure of the income group without disclosing the cost to the individual is somewhat of an inconsistency. Possibly it might be taken as an indication that our medical planners have not reached the practical stage as yet. This consideration of the rate of remuneration payable directly or otherwise to doctors is of importance to the patient in two ways. First of all, he would naturally like to know how much the medical service is likely to cost. On the other hand his personal interest would best be served if he were assured that his doctor were to be reasonably paid. To be practical in our arguments one must agree that nowadays medicine represents a source of livelihood to almost all those who practise it

and, therefore, any health reforms that tend materially to diminish the practitioner's earning power will also tend to impair the quality of his service.

The mother and child section is manifestly the main source of concern in this connection. The remarkably democratic grouping of wealthy people together with the necessitous is difficult to understand. In a typescript presented to members of the consultative council on the occasion of their meeting, the Department of Health stated: "The inclusion of any reference to a 'means test' would tend to degrade the service to the level of a 'medical charities scheme'." It must be admitted that the means test is in no way universally popular and it is obviously unpolitic to question too closely an electorate about its income. Yet the Department does not hesitate to define three distinct classes in relation to their income: the public assistance class, those with income up to £250 per year and the £250 to £500 group. This strange anomaly in policy scarcely requires comment.

What is more important to the present appraisal than the fate of Eire's doctors is a consideration of the manner in which the mother and child service will affect the patients for whom it is designed. Those near-poor who wish to avail of the obstetric and paediatric services will probably be satisfied to participate in them always provided that they approve of the district medical officer in whose administrative area they happen to live. It must, of course, be understood that under this State scheme of zoning the ancient principle of mutual choice as between private patient and doctor would have to cease.

Then to select the private practitioner for a moment's reflexion: it is apparent that unless he offers himself as a wholetime assistant to the district medical officer, his personal prospects will be far from enviable if the State furnishes a possibly very large portion of his practice with alternative *free* medical attendance without compensation for the proposed loss in income. It will be an interesting moral issue to consider whether this confiscation by the State of what amounts to private "property" without suitable recompense could, by any stretch of the imagination, be defended on the grounds of being necessary for the "common good".

In spite of protestations from the Minister that he does not intend to enforce State Medicine *as he knows it*, and that he does not intend attempting to control the voluntary hospitals, it is perfectly clear from

the text of the White Paper that such is the intention of its compilers. Apart from the references given already there are numerous verbal obscurities that can also be read as signifying the advent of State Medicine. In fact, the greatest strength of the White Paper as a political instrument lies in this very weakness. Its verbiage is so nebulous in many places that one could only possibly hope to understand the intention of certain passages when they are enacted on an Order from the Minister. The Minister himself has admitted that the Health Act is an "enabling" one. As to how far its authors will avail themselves of the great powers which it confers on the Department remains to be seen.

Let us consider how the enforcement of the principles of State Medicine would affect the patient. The influence on the quality of service is an indirect one. By abolishing private enterprise and competition in medical practice the standards of service must inevitably be lowered. As long as a doctor knows that he must do a certain amount of technical reading in order to keep in touch with the recent advances in his subject and thereby protect himself from the possibly superior academic knowledge of junior colleagues, his patients are safe from the apathy that may accompany age, and the inefficiency that may arise from the possession of an assured income. Then, too, State Medicine *as the writer knows it* from a study of world literature and from the personal exchange of views with experts on the subject from other countries, invariably means a deterioration of the so-called doctor-patient relationship. The person becomes a "case" and in forfeiting his individuality he also tends to lose the personal interest that the one-time family doctor had in him and his family.

Worthy of special mention is the proposal that the State should arrogate to itself the parental duty of education. It is extremely doubtful that anyone with a regard for the ethics of the family life will concur with State patronage such as this. As to whether the ecclesiastical authorities would accept the notion of the State's taking on the education of young children in, for example, matters relating to sex is another debatable point.

Possibly the most noteworthy deduction to be drawn from the White Paper is that the Department of Health proposes to abolish professional secrecy. From the earliest times it has been traditional in the practice of medicine to regard as sacred the confidence of one's

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patients. Only the promotion of the common good, for instance the detection or prevention of crime or fraud, would justify the physician in disclosing any matters confided to him in a professional capacity. Apart from a very definite and unequivocal professional ruling relating to the observance of secrecy, this extraordinarily important principle has been confirmed and approved on several occasions by Papal decree. It will be recollected that amongst the new duties of the district medical officer he will be forced by the State to co-operate in case-finding relating to instances of tuberculosis and venereal diseases. This would entail the tracing of contacts and thereby imply a violation of the professional secret. Similarly the State decrees that the medical records of patients discharged from institutions as well as admission lists would be under the supervision of a non-medical regional administrator.

Whatever sociological or strategic point may be made in favour of the provision of free medical services for those who can afford to pay for them, nothing whatever could possibly be said in defence of this proposed infringement of the moral law. On moral, therefore, as well as professional grounds the medical profession may be expected firmly to refuse—even at the risk of juridical punishment—to concur in any way with the State's proposed defection. Unless this noxious proposal is immediately withdrawn one may expect a formal ecclesiastical statement on the subject of State Medicine. It will be extremely interesting, too, to learn the opinion of theologians on the proposal to annex private property without compensation and the usurpation by the State of parental duty and authority.

FRANCE AFTER THE MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS

By JEAN DUTERTRE

THE municipal elections of 19 October 1947 speeded up a political movement which had been taking shape for several months beforehand—to be precise, since the withdrawal of the Communists from the Government in May, and General de Gaulle's "come-back" in political life at about the same time.¹ Since the Liberation, the three principal Parties, Communist, Socialist, Popular Republican (this last, which is called the Popular Republican Movement—M.R.P.—is in no sense a religious Party, though inspired by professedly Christian social principles) had sat together in the Government, except during the brief Blum (Socialist) experiment at the end of 1946 and the beginning of 1947. The attitude of the Communist Ministers in the debates on the disturbances in Indo-China and Madagascar compelled the Prime Minister, M. Ramadier, to break away from them on May 4th. From that time the Government had to deal, inside Parliament, with the increasingly noisy opposition of the Communist Party, and outside, with the arrogant criticism of General de Gaulle who was calling on the French people to "rally" round him, outside the Parties, and restore order in the Republic. At the October elections the two Parties in power, Socialists and M.R.P., were overwhelmed. In the country, the French People's Rally (R.P.F.), helped by an unpopular strike of the Paris transport services whose cause is still obscure, has carried the day: it is becoming practically an Opposition Party, as strong as that of the Communists. But in Parliament the situation remains unchanged: a clumsy statement made to the Press by General de Gaulle, in which he invited the Assembly to dissolve and hold new legislative elections immediately, has rather strengthened the position of the Government which retained a provisional and shaky majority in Parliament.

¹ It will be recalled that General de Gaulle had retired from power because of Communist opposition in January 1946.

This Government, however, has shown itself powerless to put a stop to social disturbance which has been going on almost without a break since June: strikes follow on strikes: these arise, it is true, from the fact that wages are insufficient to meet the constant increase in the cost of living, but they are carefully directed towards a political end—to exploit popular discontent and make all government impossible. The strikes are sometimes declared on instructions of uncertain origin and against the will of the workers. Such strikes are really a lock-out decreed by the directors of the Communist unions for the purpose of attaining political ends. In attacking the nationalized concerns, which are the most important on account both of the numbers of workers involved and of the public services they provide, the strikes are attacking, not an employer who is the enemy of the working class, but the very structure of the State. In the complete absence of legislation on the exercise of the right to strike one can see the possibility of a dangerous political weapon.² And so, within even the General Confederation of Labour (a Communist-directed union) and in all the autonomous unions without exception, resistance to Communist dictation is on the increase: seeing the anarchy which the political strikes produce, many workers are refusing to obey orders coming from above and are demanding that every stoppage of work be decided, not by simple acclamation following on an impassioned address, but by secret vote.

Since the formation of the “Cominform”, the Socialist Party has been the object of an extremely violent attack by the Communist Party which seems to consider itself engaged in a fight to a finish. Everything that is happening suggests that the Communist Party is preparing to seize power. But violence always begets violence, and the R.P.F. (General de Gaulle’s Organisation) is determined to block the way to Communism, if necessary by force: he is going so far as to demand the exclusion of the Communists from national life, which, seeing the number of votes still polled by the Communist Party at the last elections, seems a little too much.

Between the two extremes, the “Third Power,” as it is being called, which groups together the Socialists, the M.R.P. and what is left of

² The Constitution of the Fourth Republic, accepted by referendum in October, 1946, recognises the right to strike “within the framework of the laws which govern it”, but it leaves to a future Assembly the task of drawing up these laws. So far (20 November 1947), however, no proposal on strike legislation has even been put forward for debate.

the Independent Republicans, is trying to stand out against both of them; it has wisdom, experience, all the traditional qualities and even some useful men. If the disturbance were merely political, it could meet the threat. But the economic difficulties—and, to be plain, foreign pressure—with the resultant inflaming of passion will in all probability prevent the success of a “Centre” experiment.

The problems which face the French Government are the very same as those of other countries worn out by five years of war and occupation. The replacing of the country's industrial plant and agricultural machinery (a policy of bringing up the guns for a siege) should have priority over the production of consumer goods. But the people, weary of privation and seeing their standard of living steadily falling, are losing patience. In France, the scarcity of coal hinders the resumption of normal industrial production: it is this scarcity which should explain for foreigners the insistence of all the Governments which have come to power since the Liberation on obtaining coal from the Saar and the Ruhr. Without coal no economic equilibrium is possible, and without economic equilibrium political stability is an idle fancy. Now the merit of the Government is that it has brought about, in extremely unfavourable conditions, a definite resumption of industrial activity (motor cars, textiles for instance). The most serious complaint that can be made against our Ministers is the incoherence and impotence of their agricultural policy. The farmers are not encouraged to produce, thanks partly to the fact that the fixed price at which their produce is bought is too low, and partly to a stupidly bureaucratic system of regulations. Hence it is that, following on an excellent harvest in 1946, bought by the State at an insufficient price, the growers reduced the wheat acreage for the sake of crops which would give a better return. And, since the 1947 harvest was disastrous, the corn supply is seriously low. Moreover the middlemen between producer and consumer have become much more numerous than they were in 1939 and are making money at a scandalous rate. While the “cheptel” system³ is almost entirely re-established on the same terms as in 1939, the prices of meat are such that most families have to do without it almost altogether. As for milk, the third essential product of agriculture, it is no more than a pre-1940 memory for adult town-dwellers.

³ A contract by which animals are fed and cared for in return for a share in the profits.

Yet to all appearances life has resumed its normal course. Railways and the transport system generally are—when not in the grip of strikes—irreproachably punctual. Intellectual and spiritual activity is as vibrant as ever. You ask for instances of this? Towards the end of this year 1947, all the papers and reviews are arguing vigorously about the human value of a daring and amoral film *Le Diable au Corps*. In a novel *La Peste* which is a philosophic tale in the manner and style of Voltaire, but with the thought of Pascal, Albert Camus raises new moral and religious problems touching the eternal theme of suffering, exile and evil. The public irrespective of their religious beliefs are flocking to applaud the work of Pierre Fresnay in his latest film triumph *Monsieur Vincent* (St. Vincent de Paul) the dialogue of which was written by Anouilh, one of our best dramatic authors.

These three works, *Le Diable au Corps*, *La Peste*, *Monsieur Vincent*, were written or produced by unbelievers: yet their spiritual power is so intense that people are everywhere discerning in them the heritage of the classical writers and philosophers. But specifically religious thought is highly active too: certain courses at the Paris Social Week on the Christian conception of man (P. de Lubac), on the Marxist conception of man (J. Lacroix); the polite but animated debates between Theological Schools all equally anxious to offer the people of our time an authentic and living Christianity; above all the Pastoral Letter of the Cardinal Archbishop of Paris *Progress or Decline of the Church*, which daringly points new paths to the Christians of to-day; all these manifestations, each in its own way, bear witness to an undiminished vitality in the realm of the spirit.

That is why the foreign observer should not be too ready to dismiss the political battles which take place in France as merely the quarrels of ambitious men in a decadent country. The drama which puts in opposition two conceptions of life—which may be roughly called Soviet and American—is being played out here in the name of the whole world not in the deeds of men, but in their innermost consciences. The attitude of the “Third Power” in this respect is characteristic. “We refuse,” they say, “wholly to approve or condemn either one or other of these two extreme conceptions of political life. For us there can be no question of merely accepting or rejecting. Evidence, which Descartes declared to be the primary rule of his method, does not compel us to do so: we know both too much and

too little about them to be able to commit ourselves." In spite of all the crimes by which Soviet Russia has defiled herself, many thinkers are wondering whether they would not be betraying the cause of humanity and so defiling their conscience in preventing the victory of the Communist ideal. Beyond all doubt, memories of the French Revolution which, though blood-stained and denounced as shameful by Europe, was nevertheless useful, play an important part in the hesitancy of many people, and in certain apparently startling decisions. On the other hand, the reconstruction of German industry under the protection, as everybody knows, of the Transatlantic Trusts makes the most ardent admirers of Western Democracy suspect the American camp's purity of intention. In any case, Frenchmen are no more anxious now than they were in the days of Nazi propaganda to let themselves become involved in a crusade against Russia. On the other hand, they do not readily believe the sinister interpretations constantly given by the Press of the extreme Left to the most innocent actions of the American Government; and they are sufficiently well informed to know that American aid is indispensable to the restoration of Europe.

Except for a small number of unimaginative theorists who, unfortunately, are very vocal and may one day lead the discontented mass into tragedy and disaster, the French People sees that neither camp possesses the whole truth: it is, however, inclined to believe—I speak of the people and not of the middle-class nor of the industrial magnates—that in spite of America's unparalleled technical success the future lies rather in the direction of Socialism, and it sees in the Soviet experiment, shorn of its visionary claims, a rough outline of this Socialism. But this conviction of the French People in no way weakens the natural ties which bind it to those who twice in thirty years have helped it win its freedom from foreign occupation, and towards whom it is drawn by both history and civilisation. So the problem is not as simple as it appears to many foreign visitors. Public opinion is definitely divided, but the serious (and at the same time consoling) thing about it for the dignity of human thought is this, that each individual feels the division within himself. Very few French workers, for instance, imagine that the Russian worker lives more comfortably than the American; as against that they believe—rightly or wrongly—that there is more social justice in Russia, and they plump for social justice. Their reasoning may be faulty, even absurd, but it is at the back of all their thought, and among intellec-

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tuals such reasoning is conscious. We are not justified in accusing these men of bad faith, and any attempt to make them see the light by the use of violence will get us nowhere: for while Might may decide who is "right" for the moment, it will not give us the solution of any problem. At all periods of danger in history it is on men such as those of the "Third Power" that a country depends, if she is to find some way of avoiding violent upheaval.

In a recent article in the review *Esprit* the suggestion was made that the world conflict in which we are all now engaged could be ended by our falling back on the practical solution which had to be adopted at the close of the wars of religion: since unity of Faith could not be secured by violence, the principle *cuius regio eius religio* had to be applied. Thanks to this formula hostile communities could live in peace side by side, while recalcitrants were free to leave their native land and seek under other skies their spiritual home. The solution is incomplete, but historically it has proved effective. The suggestion, then, is that the political religions which divide the world should recognise their respective territorial frontiers, and leave their subjects free to emigrate to wherever their particular ideology is being applied. I do not want to pass judgment on this suggestion. Faced as it is by widespread and unbridled passion and opposed by the well-known views of certain National Leaders, it has very little chance of success. I merely mention it as evidence of a mentality which is rather common in this country, where the idea of launching a modern Crusade makes no appeal.

It is impossible to foretell who will be governing France a few weeks from now. It can be said, however, that, even if there be an outbreak of violence, hope will not have perished: in these new circumstances, Frenchmen will yet strive to give flesh and blood to the old ideal which has lost none of its appeal: Liberty, Equality, Fraternity.

PARIS, 20 NOVEMBER 1947

MEMORY AND MAN

By E. F. O'DOHERTY, M.A., PH.D. (Cantab.)

YOU are probably familiar with the widespread notion that the psychiatrist or psycho-analyst (they are not the same thing) can penetrate the "unconscious," can awaken memory of forgotten events, can re-excite repressed emotions, dissociated from their proper objects, which have been playing havoc with the individual's mental life since childhood or infancy. You have probably—perhaps unconsciously—come to believe in the existence of a region of the mind, wherein memories and emotions, like so many wild beasts in a den, prowl endlessly, seeking an outlet. Or perhaps you thought of it under a different metaphor. The mind may have seemed to you to be something like a great iceberg—one eleventh of it, beautiful and attractive, visible above the waves, but the other ten-elevenths submerged, hidden, dangerous, mysterious. How often have you thought: it must be fascinating to be a psychologist, to know all the mysterious depths of the mind, to explore the den, and identify the wild beasts, to be able to say what a man is thinking; not merely that, but to be able to tell him what he does not even know he is thinking. You have probably said: "They don't know all about the mind yet, but they have certainly gone an enormous distance, and anyway psychology is but a young science. They will soon know what the mind is and what it does."

I

I don't know how familiar you are with terminology, but it does not really matter. You have heard of things like mental energy, repression, inhibition, sublimation. You know vaguely how the theory goes: an unpleasant, unwelcome idea is pushed out of consciousness into the unconscious mind ("repressed"), from whence its re-entry into consciousness is forbidden. The energy attached to the unwelcome idea seeks an outlet. If it is refused an outlet over a protracted period, it either forces one, or produces a symptom. But if the energy is directed to a higher plane in time ("sublimated"), then no breakdown occurs.

The impression produced is that modern psychology has at last

begun to understand human nature. It would be unfair to censure the general public for accepting this. In large measure, it cannot help accepting the results of good publicity and mass propaganda. Say a thing loudly enough and often enough, and large masses of people are bound to accept it. But have you ever noticed the nature of the modern doctrines about the mind?—the doctrines that are supposed to illuminate human nature? Two things are fairly obvious about most of these doctrines—one is that they nearly all involve a more or less disguised materialistic conception of the mind and its processes; the other is that they are for the most part descriptions of what the mind is alleged to do, rather than of what it is. It is worth considering this for a moment.

The very terminology used should put a thinking man on his guard. The term usually used to describe the processes of compensation, repression, over-evaluation, projection, sublimation, etc., is “mental mechanisms.” The mind is considered as a machine—a highly complicated machine, it is true, but still a machine, whose activities can be analysed into mechanical sequences of cause and effect. Even the very popular and unscientific word “breakdown” to describe a mental illness, is taken directly from the analogy of a machine. Some psychologists—but they are relatively few—are alive to the dangers of the “machine” analogy. But on the whole, I think it is fair to say that most psychologists, and the generality of the reading public, forget that they are using inadequate, analogical terms when they speak of the mind in this way, and are carried on by the very force of the terms used, to subscribe, almost unconsciously, to a doctrine of human nature, and of the soul, which by implication denies its spiritual reality and supernatural destiny. And in this, I am not criticising merely the extreme psycho-analytic school, but all those who fail, or refuse, to acknowledge the reality of a spiritual principle in man, which has functions not dependent on matter, and is capable of an existence untrammelled by the laws of time and space.

II

When you think the matter over dispassionately, it does seem extraordinarily unlikely, after twenty-five centuries of philosophy, and two thousand years of Christianity, during which time the greatest human minds have grappled constantly, and in almost unbroken succession, with the problem of man, that it remained an unsolved

problem until modern psychology with its materialistic technique, came to man's aid.

It should not be concluded from what I have been saying, that I am trying to scrap modern psychology altogether. To attempt to do so would be a serious injustice to a large number of honest men, animated by a noble desire for truth, who have accumulated a great mass of established fact about the mind in their psychological laboratories and their clinical studies. My point is, that most of what is valuable in this mass of fact is concerned with what men do, rather than with what man is. Moreover, there is a vast literature calling itself psychology, to which reputable psychologists, Catholic and non-Catholic alike, refuse to subscribe. This is the mass of hypothesis and guess-work written by popularisers of psychology, which the reading public is led to accept as fact.

For instance, how many of us ever stop to ask: is there such a thing as an "unconscious mind", or a "region of the unconscious"? Notice that to ask "is there an unconscious mind" is not the same as to ask "is the mind ever unconscious"? The answer to the latter is, of course, yes. The mind is unconscious in sleep, under an anaesthetic, or after a very severe blow on the head, for instance. It is not a different mind, but a different condition of the same mind. Have you ever asked "What is consciousness?" If you have, then the notion of "an unconscious region" of the mind will be seen to involve a contradiction in terms. For, can there be a "region" of something which is indivisible? Both consciousness and the mind are indivisible. You cannot make parts out of something which has no parts: for instance, you cannot divide realities such as truth, justice, pain, goodness, beauty, into parts. You can have a beautiful part of a thing, or a part of a beautiful thing, but you cannot have a part of "beauty". In the same way you cannot have a part of consciousness, (though we might say that a man could be "partly conscious", meaning "somewhat unconscious"), nor can you separate a part of the mind from the rest. We might illustrate the point this way: you can fill a room with conscious people, but you cannot fill it with consciousness; you can say of a man that he is "thoughtful", but you cannot fill a room with thoughts. In other words, things such as mind, consciousness, thought, have no dimensions, and therefore cannot have "parts" or "regions". For that reason also, you cannot speak of "mechanisms of the mind", "the

region of the unconscious", "dissociation" or "split personality", except by way of metaphor. The metaphor does describe, in a crude way, something true and real about human nature, into which one might go at some future date. For the moment it is enough to recognise the metaphorical nature of these expressions.

III

One can easily understand the attraction modern psychology has for the fairly intelligent reading public. For those who have no proper conception of the human soul, and of the nature and purpose of human life, this attraction amounts almost to fascination. The reason for this, undoubtedly, is the fact that man is a conscious being. As such, he is aware of the contents of his mind, and to some extent, he is aware of the fact that several different processes go on in his mind. Sometimes he is surprised at the contents he discovers, and sometimes at the process that is going on. It may happen, for example, that he is in a state of undue anxiety, a sort of vague dread, for no apparent reason. Or a strange bizarre idea occurs to him, and persists for a long time, preventing his concentrating on his work, and resisting his best endeavours to banish it. Again, it may be that something he knows well—a friend's name, for example—simply will not come back to him when it is most required. He knows it well. If anybody mentions it, he will recognise it. But his mind is a complete blank. These, and many such experiences are the lot of every man. They draw attention to the mind, and deepen its mystery. Up against the reality of his own mind in this way, man cannot help asking questions.

At first sight, the theory of the active influence of unconscious mental contents and processes on the present conscious life of an individual seems helpful. We begin to wonder, is this the key to the mystery? Provided we do not think too much about it, we can rest content that we have the key there, in the notion of unconscious infantile memories. Sooner or later, however, we must ask ourselves what are memories? What is the nature of memory? And it then becomes obvious that our crude materialistic mechanical conception of a "store-house" where "memories" are kept, waiting to be called out as occasion demands, is entirely inadequate. For the mind is not a "place" where "things" can be stored up, nor can "memories" be properly regarded as concrete, individual, persistent things. Even

less satisfactory is the popular notion (spread by some physiologists, and accepted by many psychologists) that memories are in some way identified with "traces" left in the brain by the experiences an individual undergoes. There is no evidence for this, in the first place. And even if there were, it would not solve the problem. For a trace in my brain simply is not the event I remember, any more than the black marks on this page are the ideas you are now thinking about. Moreover, there are two different kinds of memory—there is the concrete memory for individual things and events, colours, sounds, smells, and so on, which we share with animals. There is no doubt that a dog "remembers" his master, or a bird its nest, in this way. But then there is also the kind of memory which is concerned with knowledge of a different order. Thus, I can remember Euclid's proof that the sum of the angles of any triangle is equal to two right-angles. I can remember what I once knew of the nature of virtue, of angels, of theoretical physics, and of a host of other things. Notice that it is not the sound of the words, nor their appearance in print (in other words, not just colours, sounds and smells, as in the former class of memories), which I remember, but the ideas involved, the "meanings" of these things. A material thing, such as a slab of marble, can carry "traces" of the sculptor's chisel, in the form of an inscription, over many, many years. But the marble cannot know the "meaning" of the words. A canvas can bear the traces of an artist's brush, in the form of colours, for centuries, but the canvas cannot appreciate the meaning and beauty of the whole. It takes a mind to interpret the inscription, and to appreciate the work of art.

IV

To the credit of psychologists like Freud, Jung, and Adler, it must be said that they have drawn attention to what they call the reality of a "psyche" or "psychic principle" in man. They refuse to believe that man is nothing more than a piece of matter organised into a highly complicated machine. But they have only succeeded in exchanging a material machine for a "mental" one. They shy away from the conception of a real substantial spiritual principle—man's soul—which belongs to a different order of reality from matter and machines. You cannot make a stone grow or reproduce itself, you cannot make a rose or tree hear you if you speak to it. Neither can you teach your dog the elements of Euclid, nor your parrot the mean-

ing of the words he repeats. For a thing will only do what is in accordance with its nature. If we apply this to man, it becomes obvious that he does not "remember colours, sounds, smells, etc.," because his body is material. Were this so, the stone should also "remember." Nor because it is a living organism, for roses and trees are living organisms. He remembers these things because he is a sentient organism, as the dog and the parrot are sentient organisms. But man is more than this, because he can do things which the dog and the parrot cannot do—he can remember "ideas" and "meanings." No material thing, no merely living organism, or merely sentient organism can do this. Hence we conclude that man does this because he is more than a material thing, more than a merely living organism, more than a sentient creature. He does it because of the spiritual thing in him which makes him what he is. You can fill a balloon with gas until it bursts. But you cannot fill a mind with memories or ideas, for the mind is not a material container like the balloon, nor are ideas or memories material things like the molecules of gas. We are too often misled by our own mistaken analogies. The mind means the spiritual principle in man—it means the soul in action in a particular way. You cannot fill the mind with ideas because the notion of quantity does not even enter in. The capacity of the mind to acquire knowledge is not limited except by opportunity and the time factor. For what is there that man cannot know? Everything that is in his universe, everything that can be an object of experience, direct or indirect, can be for man an object of knowledge.

And just as the intellectual faculty of man's spirit knows no frontiers, so also his capacity for desiring can never be filled up by finite things. St. Augustine understood this well when he said: "Thou hast made us for thyself, O God, and our heart shall find no rest until it rest in Thee."

V

It is true that modern psychology has drawn attention to processes of the mind which at first sight seem surprising. But they are only surprising if initially we start out with the false conception of man as a creature ruled entirely and in all things by reason—the "perfect natural man" or the "noble savage" of the Rationalist tradition. This, of course, was a caricature of man. It ignored the very real animal side of man's nature. It took no account of the passions and

emotions, the instincts, desires, and feelings of the non-rational side of man's being. Equally false was the notion that man was at heart an angel, and his real nature and existence angelic in character—that this angel happened to be joined temporarily (or even “imprisoned”) in a piece of disreputable clay, whose processes and functions the “angel” could afford to ignore.

It was a severe blow to the Rationalists to have it pointed out to them by materialists and atheists from within the psychological camp (who, they thought, should have supported them), that their exaltation and worship of Reason and the Rational Man was at variance with the facts. It must have been even more painful to hear from their erstwhile allies that even they themselves in their very Rationalism were animated not simply by pure and abstract reasoning, but were driven by submerged aggressive impulses, by unconscious jealousy and envy, even by a badly sublimated “libido,” to carry on their war against Christ, His Church, and the Supernatural.

But the Angel-Theorists got a rude shock also. It was suddenly brought home to them that man was not a disembodied spirit, but a spirit of a very special kind whose proper sphere of action lay in conjunction with a body. They had to realise that they had come very close to the Manichæan heresy in their (often unexpressed) idea that the body was bad, and that its emotions, instincts, desires, were bad. Modern psychology served a good purpose when it emphasised that this pulsating life of the conative side of man is essential to man's welfare.

But modern psychology did not discover this. It was well known for centuries to poets, philosophers, priests and saints. The farther one goes in fact, in the study of psychology, the more one realises the real greatness of a man like St. Thomas Aquinas in his penetration of human nature, and the more vividly one appreciates the supernatural wisdom of the Church. For the key to human nature will not be found in “mental mechanisms”, but in a proper understanding of the relation of soul and body, together with the doctrines of man's creation, his fall, his redemption, and his supernatural destiny.

GUIDANCE CLINICS FOR PROBLEM CHILDREN

1. THEIR NEED

By SR. MARIE HILDA, S.N.D.

Director of Notre Dame Child Guidance Clinic, Glasgow.

FOUR different lines of approach, viz., educational, medical, criminal and parental, have led to the establishment of Child Guidance Clinics.

When the 1870 Education Act was passed and compulsory attendance enforced, it was at once recognised that many children had to be excluded, such as the blind, the deaf, epileptics and cripples. These were gradually provided for along with other children suffering from physical defects. At the beginning of the 20th century standardised intelligence tests began to be used for discriminating between normal and subnormal mentality. Just before the first World War special schools were inaugurated for high-grade defectives who could not possibly profit by attendance in ordinary classes and yet were educable along certain lines. Special training courses were designed for those teachers who chose to devote themselves to this branch of education.

Even when all these children were eliminated there were still many misfits in the ordinary school—a nuisance both to teacher and class, e.g., the fidget, the late-comer, the dreamer, the indolent and the fighter. All such children disturb the peace and routine of the classroom and demand special investigation (for which the teacher has neither time nor experience) to discover the cause of the abnormality. The Child Guidance Clinic supplies the need.

In the study and treatment of mental break-down amongst civilians and those in the forces, as the result of war strain, psychiatrists realised that signs of inability to stand up to crises were evident in the early years of the majority of their patients, appearing in the form of enuresis, melancholia or hysteria. Hence, if children who tend to shirk difficulties, who brood over grievances, who exaggerate aches and pains, were to receive attention in a Child Guidance Clinic, future mental illness might be avoided.

Research on the history of prison inmates showed petty delinquencies and criminal tendencies in adolescent years. If pilferers, liars and sexual offenders were dealt with sympathetically at a Child Guidance Clinic in early life, the graver offences of later life might be reduced.

To the Jesuits is attributed the saying: "Give me a boy before he is seven and the ill-effects of heredity can be counter-balanced by a good environment." Modern psychology goes further back and stresses the importance of the two to three age when the child is beginning to realise its own individuality and self-will begins to assert itself.

Education neither begins nor ends in the school. Parents are responsible for the early training, physical, mental and spiritual in the pre-school years. Nowadays, for every profession in life, definite training is demanded: for parenthood there is none. Many parents have difficulty in handling the temper-tantrums, the food-fads, the nail-biting of their children; again, in adolescence there are further problems, as this is the age of independence, of sex-consciousness and of mental conflict. Gladly do the parents avail themselves of the help in a Child Guidance Clinic.

From all these different angles "problem children" emerge—children who are unable to solve their own difficulties and who do not respond to ordinary disciplinary measures to eradicate abnormal or anti-social behaviour.

Misbehaviour or misconduct, either in children or adults, may be defined as an outward sign of inward conflict. In the past, drastic treatment may have got rid of the symptom, but the cause was left untouched, to find another outlet, needing further correction. The essential aim of the Child Guidance Clinic is to discover the cause of the conflict and hence the disappearance of the symptom.

There seem to be three general causes of misbehaviour, again in both adults and children, viz., lack of affection, lack of security and lack of congenial occupation.

As social beings children need to be loved by someone, not necessarily demonstrative affection, which is often merely selfishness, but the assurance that they are of definite importance in their environment. Security is even more necessary than affection. Inconsistency of treatment by the parents or teachers has a disastrous effect

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on children. Finally, children need interest in some occupation suited to their capacity, otherwise idleness breeds mischief.

Just as there are three general causes underlying misconduct, so there are three general types corresponding to the lack of control of the three fundamental emotions, anger, fear and self-love. These take specific forms in accordance with heredity and environment—anger, by different forms of aggression; fear, by varied means of escape; self-love, by numerous ways of self-assertion.

We must never forget that all emotions are good in themselves to be used under the guidance of intelligence for personality development:

Anger is needed to enable obstacles to be overcome to reach a determined goal in spite of opposition, to use aggression justly and wisely in carrying out designs, but it is difficult to “be angry and sin not”.

“Fear is the *beginning* of wisdom.” It warns us to defer action when ignorant, not to shirk all activity which is cowardice, but to foresee and be cautious rather than impulsive in our acts.

Self-love is necessary for salvation. “Love your neighbour as yourself” is the commandment—to love another more than yourself is heroism. However, love of others is a test of Christianity and children must be taught that “cupboard love” should be replaced by a mutual love which shares and gives as well as gets.

These are the problems to be solved and some of the principles employed in Child Guidance Clinics.

REMORSE AND REPENTANCE

By JOSEPH O'MARA, S.J.

AS an appendix to his succinct exposé and critique of Jean Paul Sartre's "L'Être et le Néant", P. Roger Troisfontaines¹ has presented a brief but penetrating analysis of two closely allied yet widely divergent states of conscience—remorse and repentance. Some dozen years previously on the occasion of the publication of Vladimir Jankélévitch's subsidiary thesis² for the Sorbonne doctorate, P. Gaston Fessard³ covered much the same ground. Both the discussions are mainly speculative, but their practical implications, moral and religious, are far-reaching and merit attention. It is the purpose of the following pages to suggest some pertinent reflections on the theme: remorse—repentance.

I

It is a commonplace that words, and the ideas they express, tend to lose their original clear-cut definition. Daily intercourse, with its broad approximations and verbal compromises, is a great leveller of distinctions—the more drastic for passing unnoticed. Under the rub of common usage, niceties of expression, precision of terms—and of thought—are easily and frequently smoothed into an undifferentiated and interchangeable vagueness. Nor is this all to the bad. Human converse would be sadly restricted, or even more sadly boring, were the last exquisite perfection of accuracy demanded of every chance utterance. But neither is it all to the good. Hazy speech too often masks the blurring of notional contours. If we cannot correctly *say* what we mean, is it not because we do not clearly *know* what we mean? Amongst the many victims of this confusion of word and thought, remorse and repentance are striking examples. And in this instance the confusion not infrequently seeps through the outer layers of speech and thought, and clouds even the inner eye of conscience. Nor does the evil always stop there, for the blind or weak-sighted conscience is the privileged prey of anxiety and scruples, of lethargy

¹ Le Choix de J. P. Sartre, Paris, Aubier, 1945.

² La Mauvaise Conscience, Paris, Alcan, 1933.

³ Recherches de Sciences Religieuses, avril 1934, pp. 165-198.

and discouragement, of an eventual hardening and insensitiveness. Dissipate the fog of conscience, and "the whole shall be lightsome".

Remorse, repentance: two attitudes of soul with much in common, yet radically different. They are both forms of regret and self-reproach, condemnatory of a sinful past. But the condemnations, when allowed to attain the full force of their implications, have final outcomes separated by all the terrifying distance between the "And Judas went and hanged himself" and the "Going out, he wept bitterly" of St. Peter. That two such diverse states of the moral conscience should be derivatives of an amoral parent stock, regret, is instructive. Regret, pure and simple, lays no accusation at the door of conscience—neither of my own nor of another's. It is strictly neutral. "I regret my mistake, but I am not to blame; nobody is to blame." Even keen, almost inconsolable, grief at some personal loss—of parent, lover, friend—can remain free of incrimination. Responsibility is nowhere assigned, except, perhaps, to some impersonal scapegoat—bad luck, circumstances. In regret, the moral will is not efficaciously engaged: the field is still open to the alternative invasion of remorse or repentance.

This invasion is prepared and set in motion by an intimate operation—reproach⁴. To regret is added a personal element, blame. But blame is not always cast with the same features; it can play a triple role. Suppose the rupture of a friendship, of a love. Something deep, which gripped the very roots of the heart, has been snapped. The frayed edges of broken intimacy irritate self-love to angry spots of bitter sensitiveness. "Our love was *mine*, *my* thing. How could you have injured *me* so? How could you have robbed *me* of *my* possession?" Jealousy, self-pity, wounded pride add their own strident note to the harsh chorus of recrimination. Two hearts that once were one congeal into the hard isolation of spitefulness or indifference.

Fortunately, the more normal form of human reproach does not reach these depths of selfishness. Hearts are torn, but it is with a common hurt. "What have *we* done? Is *our* love of so little

⁴ For the sake of greater clarity, the states of conscience considered here are taken in isolation and, as it were, in their purity. In fact they are almost always found in composition, ingredients in a varying blend of love and selfishness.

worth that it can be broken by the thoughtlessness, the neglect, the infidelity in which *we both* have a share? ” Our pained eyes search the past for the seeds of reunion, and our very reproaches are born of an intimacy that still lives.

But between the participants in this dialogue of common blame I can take sides. I can shift the full weight of responsibility either upon the other—and thus fall back into the first form of purely selfish reproach—or upon myself. And whatever is best in us inclines us more or less strongly to an exclusive self-reproach. Indeed, when there is question of sin and of the rupture of our relations with God, there is no place for any attitude of soul but that of self-reproach. Attenuating circumstances of partial ignorance, of unpreparedness, of outside physical or moral pressure, there may be, but the sin is *mine*. If I have not lost my moral sense or dulled it into a flaccid apathy, I shall rise up as my own judge. My fallen self will be self-accused, whether with barren recriminations issuing in an ever-increasing self-hatred, or with the severity of a clear-sighted charity inaugurating a new birth in the re-discovered intimacy of God’s love. Self-reproach is the seed-bed of remorse or repentance.

Remorse—and before the mind appear the eternal figures of Cain, Macbeth, Judas, Raskolnikoff.

“What hands are here? ha! they pluck out mine eyes!
Will all great Neptune’s ocean wash this blood
Clean from my hand? No; this my hand will rather
The multitudinous seas incarnadine,
Making the green one red.”

It is well named “remorse”, the repeated self-gnawing of the criminal soul. Where regret was the mere recognition of an absence, of a loss, remorse is the present obsession of the past—and of a past that is *mine*. Time flies, we say. Yes, but what is done remains; no part of it disappears except the possibility of its undoing. It is not the mere remembrance of the deed that survives, but the deed itself. My sin is more than a regretful memory of lost innocence; it is a biting cancerous growth, eating with pitiless insistence into the very quick of conscience. With slow, implacable advance it spreads, reaching the farthest recesses of the soul, rotting all the props of courage, undermining every barrier of forgetfulness or dissipation set

up to hem it in. If only I could get away from myself, escape from under the intolerable dead weight of the past. The irrevocable past! Steep myself in pleasure, lull my torment in the numbing routine of work, shut out the din of conscience in the distracting song of good-fellowship, seek easing pity in the understanding of a friend? Empty hopes! The moment of relief is but the prelude to acuter pain. I must always come home to my own desolate hearth. I can but hug my sin to myself in a frightening waste of loneliness. I shall nurse my pain in secret. No one shall know of it. No one shall condemn. No one shall pity. Who wants pity? Rather, hide the festering sore from the prying eyes of the sinless and the pharisee. Leave me alone; I want no companion in my solitude. Leave me in peace. Peace?—the mocking ghost of innocence! How could I have been such a fool? O God, why must You abandon me to myself? God?—there is no God for me. He has thrown me off. “Depart from Me, ye cursed.” Cursed of God!—No; there is no God. Self-cursed! The irrevocable past! Too late now; there is no going back. Alone with my sin. Death were better than this living nightmare. Alone!

Where remorse is not purely or mainly pathological in its intensity, it is the result of a free moral choice. The eyes of the soul are fixed in an anguished gaze upon the fragments of a shattered union. At this moment of sorrowful awareness, there is presented to my freedom the painful, wearisome, humbling task of gathering together the broken scraps and offering them to the strong, remoulding hands of Christ’s forgiveness. But my will is soaked in selfishness. “I am alone and suffering. So much the worse for me; it is my own fault. At any rate I will not go a-begging for mercy. I can manage my own affairs.” My self-sufficient pride, which constitutes the malice of my sin, will not be disavowed. I will remain enclosed within the circle of my own sinful aloofness, feeding my inner life upon the rank, corrupting weeds of blind revolt. Revolt against God, revolt against my fellows, revolt against myself! There is no love; there is only despairing self-hatred. Take your filthy money. I will have none of it. “And Judas went and hanged himself.”

II

But another issue lies open to my bruised conscience. My self-reproach can focus the searching light of sorrowful recollection not

exclusively upon the sinful and irrevocable past, but upon the tattered remnants of a divine friendship. Instead of losing myself in the destroying isolation of proud self-hatred, I can find myself again in the humble desire of renewed intimacy. Instead of allowing my freedom to turn against itself in barren bitterness, I can reverse the selfish folds of egoism. It is a question of choice, but of choice backed and sustained by God's ever-present and forestalling grace. I can choose myself alone or I can choose communion with Him. "And the Lord turning, looked on Peter" with the same eyes of invitation that had looked upon Judas in the Garden; and, where Judas turned aside in a blind horror of self-disgust, Peter understood the eternal message of God's love—that the traitor's only friend is He whom he has betrayed. "And going out, he wept bitterly."

This decisive moment of free conversion is an initial gesture, at once human and divine, which contains virtually the close embrace of the kiss of peace. "I will arise and go to my Father." Repentance is born of this movement of return, and, with the first step upon the rough journey home, the soul is freed from the haunting grip of the inexorable past. I can lift my eyes from their absorbed concentration on my own abjection. I can see my sin for what it is—the severing of a bond. I see a sharer in a common love, and even in my sin I am not alone; for the divine condescension covers my sorrow with the urgent anticipation of reunion. Remorse was a turmoil, following on the slow dilapidation of the soul; true repentance begins and develops in serenity. It is not that I refuse to recognise the sin as mine, but that I know that "when as yet we were sinners. . . . Christ died for us." In the security of that knowledge, I can face my own conscience with calm and find in it a source of gratitude. The vital current of my will no longer nourishes my sin with a morbid and proud self-preoccupation; it turns, instead, to gather up and vivify all the forces of reparation. I can stand apart from my sin and look upon it almost as a stranger—as the stranger and enemy it ought to be. I can view it in itself and in its pedigree, and this steady, objective gaze sterilises the evil proliferation of its growth. My sin is seen in its true setting—embedded in my limitations, in my weakness, in my cowardice. And, seen thus, it provides the antidote to my self-sufficiency.

Self-knowledge, however humble and humbling, will not satisfy my repentant conscience. The grace-inspired desire of reunion carries me onward to avowal. "I have sinned against heaven and before

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thee." That my sorrow may not turn again, almost imperceptibly perhaps, into a deluding self-pity, I will lay bare before my offended Lover the fulness of my misery. He knows that misery, and my confession will discover nothing new to His watchful, waiting patience. It will reveal nothing—no; but it will provoke the answer for which my soul has searched. My cry of humble longing will be caught up in the strong voice of a thirsting God, in the returning cry of pardon. And this pardon, the fruit of repentance, is a giving, a *for-giving*, a giving to the utmost limits, total, absolute. And because it is absolute, it absolves. It is the sweeping onrush of a divine torrent, too long held back by the solid, sullen wall of sinful arrogance. Now that the dam has been pierced by the sorrowful admission of guilt, the merciful waters of God's love flood the contrite soul. "My son that was dead, is come to life." This life, that has been found again, is not the renewal of lost innocence; it is not the reversal of time's flow nor the abolition of the material contexture of the past. It is a fresh creation, in which the soul is born again of God. The whole leaning and direction of the will is changed, its very fibres have been reawakened by a new and urgent vital sap. Where sin had been encysted in the soul, there is now nothing but the scar that tells of the healing of the charity of Christ. And this healing brings with it the promise of holiness—the holiness of a Peter, of a Paul, of an Augustine. For charity, which is the root principle of sanctity, is God's own love brought down to the limits of human weakness and informing this weakness with a divine strength. It is always operative, always exacting. God's love, entering the soul, turns immediately to the work of giving, to answering its own invitations: it sets up an echo of itself, which is thrown back on the Giver.

Remorse is a sad and hateful isolation; repentance is a joy, because it is a communion. "Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted."

THE EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN BACKGROUND OF O'CONNELL'S NATIONALISM

III.—AMERICA AND IRISH LEGISLATIVE INDEPENDENCE

By R. DUDLEY EDWARDS

THE second article in this series, published in the December, 1947 issue,¹ attempted to trace the attitude to the American war of independence of the Irish protestant aristocracy and middle-class, of the presbyterians, and finally of the catholics. In the present contribution I shall endeavour to trace the consequent reaction of the American struggle upon the political affairs of Ireland. Perhaps the most obvious question that might be asked would be why the American struggle ended in the establishment of a separate nation—the United States—while in Ireland American inspiration and local effort went hardly beyond the securing of what contemporary writers called “legislative independence”. As will be seen later the movement for legislative independence was followed by an effort on the part of some to secure parliamentary reform but the fact remains that the really big effort was for legislative independence and once this was secured the struggle lost its national character and became rather an internal one between the aristocracy and that element of the middle-classes who were aspiring to share in political privileges. To put it in another way, the tyranny of George III and the new tories in Great Britain provoked a situation in America which was avoided in Ireland by timely concessions at the critical juncture. A re-consideration of those parts of the American Declaration of Independence, quoted in my last article, will bring out the essential differences in the situation in both countries.

Under eight numbered headings I set out those American grievances which have a direct bearing on the Irish political situation. Of these, the first six quoted might equally well have been included in an Irish

¹ The date of the catholic petition, as given in the last line of that article, should read 1775 and not 1755.

statement: (1) the king refused his assent to wise legislative proposals; (2) he directed his viceroys to veto pressing and urgent bills; (9) the judges held office and received their salaries by royal favour alone; (10) he created many new (and unnecessary) offices particularly for needy Englishmen; (11) the parliament had no control over the army in time of peace any more than in wartime; (13) the king with his ministers countenanced and approved the measures of the British parliament extended by that institution to Ireland and to America: in particular this power was used (c) to restrict trade, (d) impose taxes, (e) suspend trial by jury, (f) legalise trials beyond the seas and (g) abolish English liberties in Canada. Only one of these last categories applied to Ireland (13 (c)) but there was a general uneasy feeling that the defeat of America might have led to an extension of Ireland's grievances along these very lines.

It had been (13 (c)) the imposition of taxes by British legislation that finally had led to the situation of general recalcitrance which had brought about the decision by the king and the British ministry to send troops to America and restore order. Conflict had been inevitable and when it came the government had not hesitated to use the despised and hated redskins against the rebels (and was later to employ Irish catholics and German Hessians). Despite the voiced opposition of a few noble spirits like Chatham and Burke the British parliament had shown itself deaf to the appeals of the Americans and had overwhelmingly endorsed the action of the government. It was in these particulars that the situation in America had developed differently from that in Ireland. For in Ireland it could not be said in 1782 that (14) the king had abdicated government by declaring the country out of his protection and waging war on it; or (18) that (though he had flirted with the despised papists) he had excited domestic insurrection; nor had the British people in their parliament shown themselves deaf to the appeal of Ireland. It was the change of government from tories to whigs (who had even gone the length of offering to the American rebels legislative independence within the empire) which led to England's abandonment of those recited types of tyrannical injustice (though the royal veto was retained and the right to create new offices not abandoned). And in these circumstances the concessions of 1782 amply met the demands for self-government so that, beyond a mere hint in one or two pamphlets, there was no movement in Ireland as in America for secession.

A few words will show how this remarkable change had come about in the state of affairs of Ireland. As was stated in the previous article, political opposition had become very weak and it was not until the American Declaration of Independence had been published that the basis of British control over Irish legislation had been openly challenged in the Irish parliament. It might even be suggested that but for the government's determination to use its undue influence, the Irish parliament would hardly have come to realise (and certainly not to have had to endure such vigorous oratorical protestations) that America was fighting Ireland's cause as well as her own. Gradually, as the resistance continued across the Atlantic, the analogy between the position in the two countries became more clear. Miss Theresa M. O'Connor, in an article in *Irish Historical Studies* (No. 5, pp. 1-11), has shown that when in 1776 the government imposed an embargo on the export of Irish provisions there was an immediate protest in the Irish parliament at this unconstitutional suspension of an Irish law. The embargo was declared to be a grievous injury to Irish trade, and so well did the parliamentary opposition make its case under this last head that even Lecky was led to accept the thesis that the embargo annihilated the Irish provision trade. The truth of the matter appears to be that the Irish commercial interest, disgusted at the government's decision to restrict the export market in order to secure a monopoly for supplying the troops, raised the cry that the provision trade was ruined which the parliamentary opposition was able to utilise by seizing on the evidence of high prices (in reality due to the scarcity caused by the extensive British buying—and which would have been even higher in an unrestricted market) to challenge the government on the constitutional issue. Inevitably this raised the whole question of free trade. Profiting by the French and Spanish entry into the war the government was able to gain a greater degree of real support from the Irish parliament and in return felt constrained to make some concessions to Irish dissatisfaction over the commercial restraints. But when Lord North communicated to the British parliament the nature of the proposed concessions there was an immediate outcry among English trade interests and the consequent amendments in the relief measure were so drastic as to make it a mere gesture. The result was that attention in Ireland was inevitably focussed on the British legislative overriding authority. As a pamphleteer in 1779 stated, "the interest of the butchers or fishmongers, or any other dirty

corporation of London would outweigh that of all the dominions annexed to the British crown" (quoted in R. B. McDowell, *Irish Public Opinion*, p. 56).

Meanwhile the government, seeking to reinforce its defeated armies in the New World, had sought Irish parliamentary approval for the removal to America of substantial elements of the army quartered in Ireland. As the army in Ireland was governed under a mutiny act passed at Westminster it was not actually necessary to take this course, but in times of peace the government used its influence in Ireland to keep (and at Irish expense to support) a greater armed force than might be maintained under arms in England under the Declaration of Right (1689). And as it was hoped to secure the continuance of the liability of the Irish exchequer (and a time of war, whatever about a time of victory and success, was not the best opportunity for imposing financial liabilities from without) the matter was brought up by resolution in the Irish house of commons. Parliament, while readily acquiescing in the transportation and equipment of the troops to the New World, showed an unexpected objection to receiving German mercenaries in their place. It was in these circumstances, concurrent with the government's increased dependence upon Irish catholic enlistment in the regular army, that there spontaneously sprang up all over the country that remarkable manifestation of Irish protestant virility—the volunteers. It is not sufficiently recollected that the volunteers, particularly in their first years, were almost exclusively protestant. (See, however, a remarkable article by Caesar Litton Falkiner in *Studies in Irish history and biography* and Father Patrick Rogers's *Irish volunteers and catholic emancipation*, ch. ii). It is not too much to say that no factor contributed more to the changed attitude of contemporary public opinion in Ireland than did this new military popular organisation. Until 1778 the Irish landed gentry had cowered behind the protection of the British army in Ireland. Most of the cowering had been done in the first generation after the battle of the Boyne, and after the debacle of the '45 it was obvious that little was to be feared from the catholic lower classes. When, however, Ireland was called upon to face a situation in which a French or Spanish invasion might take place, protestant ascendancy showed itself capable of assuming a responsibility to a degree which might hardly have been suspected in the squandering squireens of an earlier generation. Ireland's politically-minded class became military minded.

They armed, they drilled and, assuming an independent outlook which a century of subconscious fear of the catholics had hitherto rendered impossible, they awoke to the urgent necessity for expressing the popular views on the more grievous aspects of British rule in Ireland. Catholic readiness to contribute financially to their organisation, without more than an occasional catholic aspirant to membership, merely served to strengthen this responsible conviction that they, the volunteers, were the true representatives of the men of property (the only element of the population with any claim to share in political privileges). Inevitably they were led to express an opinion on free trade. Inevitably they associated themselves in the non-importation agreements (by which the Irish aristocracy and middle classes patriotically abandoned British manufactured goods rather than support the upholders of British commercial monopoly). Inevitably they led public opinion and the Irish parliament to pronounce on constitutional issues. And they gave a lead too on the question of religious toleration, though in this it was to the protestant public at large, as it was the government which took the initiative in catholic relief as some recognition of the support given in the American war.

It is of interest to note that as it was brought home to the Irish public that Britain's legislative power could be used to restrict Irish trade it inevitably led to a concentration of adverse comment on this power. In the late seventeen-seventies there was much agricultural distress in Ireland and this was inevitably attributed to England's overriding claims. The removal of a considerable number of commercial restrictions in 1780 was met with hardly any expressions of gratitude. And in the last years of the war a growing anti-English feeling could be detected which soon assumed a greater influence over the politically-minded than the former fear and intolerance of the catholic majority. It was in these circumstances that an author like Joseph Pollock, writing under the name of "Owen Roe O'Neill", could argue that Ireland's economic prosperity would only be achieved "by throwing off ALL DEPENDENCE upon the people and parliament of England, disclaiming all political connection with the latter but through our common sovereign" (McDowell, *op. cit.*, p. 61). While other writers, themselves favourable to the British connection, urged the danger of a declaration of Irish independence and an alliance with France in the near future if concessions were not made. But the most typical attitude was that of Grattan who more than any other man contri-

buted to bring about the parliamentary independence which has led to the emancipated parliament being called "Grattan's parliament". "With regard to this country," he said in April, 1780, "England . . . must go back to freedom, which as it is the foundation of her constitution so it is the main pillar of her empire; it is not merely the connection of the crown, it is a constitutional annexation, an alliance of liberty, which is the true meaning and mystery of the sisterhood, and will make both countries one arm and one soul, replenishing from time to time in their immortal connection, the vital spirit of law and liberty from the lamp of each other's light; thus combined from the ties of common interest, equal trade and equal liberty, the constitution of both countries may become immortal, a new and milder empire may arise from the error of the old."

Thus the British government was obliged to give way on all the great outstanding questions. Before the unanimous voice of the new militarily-minded Irish protestant aristocracy—loyal to-day if not to-morrow—it felt, with that remarkable British logic, so self-critical in the face of armed opposition, so self-absorbed in the presence of polite negotiators, there was no longer any valid reason for denying to Ireland what had been offered to America. And so legislation was approved which gave to the king, lords and commons of Ireland the sole legislative authority, abolished the power of the privy councils in the two countries over Irish legislative proposals, abolished the British parliament's legislative authority for Ireland, approved of an Irish mutiny act rendering the army in Ireland subject to the control of its own parliament, and rendered the Irish judges independent of the legislature by making it impossible to remove them except by the address of both houses of the Irish parliament. Thus was the Irish aristocracy satisfied by concessions which the middle-classes were soon to find illusory and which inevitably led to a new outlook under the influence of the French revolution.

MEMORIES OF SOME RECENT ART EXHIBITIONS IN DUBLIN

By DANIEL SHIELDS, S.J.

THE joy of an anthology lies in its many-sided views of life. Their sharp contrasts stir and stimulate us. A series of art exhibitions—a kind of giant anthology—has the same effect. But there is one difficulty. They can never become a pocket anthology unless perhaps in the land of Brobdingnag. Memory, not cloth or leather, has to do the work of binding, perhaps in some ways a firmer binding.

Here are a few thoughts on a painter's anthology bound in memory. I turn the first page and see life through French eyes at an exhibition held in the Waddington Galleries. To those accustomed to the academic style in painting, a visit to a French exhibition is something of a shock. It is like leaving the European quarter of an eastern city and walking into the many-coloured and crowded life of the Bazaar quarter. To enjoy this native quarter one must forget the European quarter. Standards are so completely different. If one is to enjoy a great deal of modern French art one must forget academic standards, for academic art is fundamentally representational. Raphael's madonnas would easily recognise themselves in the mirror of his brush as would a Tenier's sheep in his, but a Parisian lady with a bunch of roses in her hand would find it difficult to recognise either herself or her roses in Picasso's paint. But Picasso never meant that she should do so, at least in his recent period of painting. The pleasure we get from all visible things comes from their colour, their shape and their rhythmic line. The modern French painter taking colour and its juxtaposition, shape and line, uses them to create new forms of beauty. These may remind us of similar forms in nature but they do not claim to be copies. They are creations and as such claim to have a life and vitality of their own independently of the object which originally inspired the creation. They claim a life of their own in paint. It is true we may sometimes legitimately doubt the capacity of the painter to create this new beauty and it is in this that the competence of the painter must be judged. Perhaps it is the crude materialism of so many French painters which jars on our sensibilities

steeped in Christian tradition. Still they are creations and must be judged as such although we must never be blinded to an acceptance of the false principle of art for art's sake, allowing the irrational emotions to take the place of reason for in this way morality can be outraged in paint no less than in literature. In this exhibition non-representational design predominated. This style of painting is in an idiom to which we have got to get accustomed before we can really enjoy it, otherwise our minds are continually reverting to academic standards. Here and there among the exhibits I felt that a raw materialism sometimes pained one's sense of Christian truth and beauty.

But here I turn another page of the anthology and find myself in the Dawson Galleries looking at life through the eyes of Miss Evie Hone. She is a painter who deeply reverences the things of the spirit and the beauty of material objects and this reverence and love are everywhere evident in her work both in glass and in paint. In her portrayal of material beauty there is a tender wistfulness which rises to intense and poignant sorrow in her visions of Christ's life and death. Great and deep love lies close to tears and the poet's soul is often saddened by its love of this world's fleeting beauty. Miss Hone has a poet's soul.

The ephemeral and incidental are passed by, in her desire to emphasise the essential. Details, which so often distract in Renaissance art, are sacrificed—not that their beauty is unappreciated but that the truth and essence of her vision may shine forth undimmed. The portrayal of Christ's utter loneliness and prostration is achieved by the elimination of unimportant detail and by restraint in colour. Paradoxically, by a ruthless discipline of her medium she has evoked a strong and sincere emotion. The quality of humility—a quiet submission to the inward spirit of the subject—is found in all her work, be it landscape, still life or religious subjects, a quality so evident in the work of the Middle Ages. Miss Hone could have taken her place among the craftsmen of the Chartres and Bourges and have felt at home.

But human nature dreams. With Jack Yeats, who recently gave an exhibition in the Waddington Galleries, we enter into dreamland. Here we get the mystery and magic that so often lie behind the trivial things of life when our imagination is given free rein. His brother, W. B. Yeats, gave us the magic of a *Lake Isle of Inishfree* and now

we are wafted to similar magic isles through the medium, not of words but of paint. In his later paintings, at least, Jack Yeats veils life in mystery and romance. A fiddler or a ragman in an old Georgian street, becomes a Pied Piper and we are carried away on a scintillating tide of colour and mysterious shadow into a land of dreams. Racing horses on a Sligo beach are merely echoes of great sea horses whose shadowy forms rise from the crested billows in the distant bay, bringing us a vision of an age when Danaan Gods made merry on the ocean. A quayside in Dublin or Waterford takes on the fascination that has always drawn men to go down to the sea in ships which will bear them to fairy lands beyond the rim of the world.

The circus tent with its sawdust and flaring lamps becomes an enchanted place where the children of gods can play. Even the most commonplace things of life—veiled in glowing colour, with indistinct but always significant form—take on another deeper meaning. Like the French, Jack Yeats is a creator of visions but his creations lie closer to human emotions and his magic web is always woven from the thread of human life.

Again, I turn another page and we look at life through the eyes of Feliks Topolski in the Waddington Galleries. Here we have a stranger to our shores giving us his first impressions of our country. The exhibition includes impressions of other countries but the majority deal with Ireland. It may be a superficial recording of Irish life but it is amusing and interesting. With quick and sure line in pencil or gouache he has jotted down impressions of places and people during his Irish visit. He delights in capturing fleeting forms and movement. At Naas he gives us the tangled movement of a race-meeting crowd. In Dublin we get the tortured rhythm of the cattle market against the faded elegance of a Georgian street. The intimate homeliness of Moore Street gossipers and shoppers attracts his searching eye as interestedly as does the dignity of 18th century architecture. Crowds and movement fascinate his eye whether in Jerusalem, Cairo or Dublin and his sure line in pencil or gouache seems his happiest medium in capturing and recording his interest in human life.

I have come to the last page of my anthology and regretfully close it. Let us be thankful to these artists, for the artist's eye can see and his pencil record for us the beauty and significance of so many things in life which we fail to appreciate and carelessly pass by with dull and unseeing eyes.

MUST THE ACTOR BE CREATIVE?

By HUGH CARTON

IN his article in the November IRISH MONTHLY Mr. Gabriel Fallon appears to claim that the actor is necessarily a creative artist. I question the correctness of this view: that he may be cannot be denied, but that he must be is doubtful. Presumably Mr. Fallon limits his application of this view to proficient actors and does not include every school-girl who takes part in the annual Convent play, but even allowing this limitation, I believe, his claim is too sweeping. Naturally when discussing such a subject the construction placed on such phrases as "creative art" will play a determining part and it may well be that he and I stand on the one ground fissured by different interpretation of terms.

Briefly, my summing up of the function of the actor and the equipment he requires to perform his work worthily falls under four heads:

- (1) he must be able to portray the character he plays so that it will fall into the general scheme of the plot;
- (2) he must have had the ability and application to master the technique and craftsmanship of acting thoroughly;
- (3) no matter how superb his technique, he must have a measure of interpretative art to save his acting from death—be it ever so beautiful;
- (4) he may be a creative artist and may sometimes act in this capacity. However, he need not be one, and the exercise of this art may not always be desirable.

There is no need to advert to the subject of technique or craftsmanship; every actor must vividly recall the hard work necessary to advance the slightest step on his career. But any question of what is "art" or wherein lies the difference between related functions of art is in a top-grade class for difficulty and lack of precise delimiting definition, as witnessed by the many diverse solutions propounded by philosophers throughout the ages. While not making any claim to philosophical learning, I hope that my attempt at understanding and suggesting an acceptable answer, will be considered at least sane.

Perhaps in any conception of art there is some idea of enlivening, of infusing a living intelligence into something. The artist receives

some external stimulus which he gives forth again informed in some way by a life, a being of its own. This living quality is the hallmark of art. It is its absence in so-called "chocolate-box art" which cloyes and clogs the intelligence of the probing beholder. Chocolate boxes may be pretty but do they not encourage us to expect material pleasures, rather than a communion with the mind of the painter?

All expressions of art come ultimately from the external factors as acted on by the mind of the artist and whether the result will be critical, interpretative or creative will be determined by the way in which the artist's mind treats what he himself has received from outside. Everyone who considers a work of art, be it painting, poem or play, makes use of critical art in some degree, for he brings his intelligence to bear on it, forming a judgment based on criteria existing consciously or subconsciously in his own mind. When he expresses his judgment he becomes a critic proper and, if lucky, gets paid for it. To discuss the point at which a critic may become creative in his own right is uncertain ground.

Interpretative art, the art of the theatre, must also draw from external sources. What the artist draws he lets flow out, enlivened as running water, not dead as the Styx. But in interpretative art the material received remains basically unchanged in its expression. The concert pianist brings to life the work he is playing, he interprets it to us, imprinting something of himself on the production, but he plays from the composer's score. The actor gives existence to the character of the play, drawing on his knowledge of life and on the joys and sorrows he has himself experienced. He does not speak his lines as would a crossing-sweeper reading aloud a treatise on Relativity. The interpretative art of the actor lies in instilling life into the lines of the script.

What is creative art? What is its character and function, and how can we recognise it? Does it not consist in the creation of something which has grown from the artist's own mind and emotions, something which is peculiarly his own and fully comprehended by him alone; a child that he has brought forth from his whole being, which even when it receives its own separate existence, remains a branch of the artist's mind. The artist creates of and from himself. What he creates, his work, is the outward expression of his comment on, and realisation of life or some aspect of life. The artistic cycle

consists of three parts: firstly, the absorption of impressions and ideas by the artist; secondly, their analysis, assimilation, and synthesis with elements already in the artist's mind; and thirdly, their expression, true to himself and to his view of any external factors involved, in the artist's own mould. These three stages constitute creative art and with them the creative cycle ends. Fundamentally the difference between interpretative and creative art is that while, in the former, the material is expressed basically unchanged, in the latter it is broken down, digested, combined with others and produced as something entirely the artist's own.

But with all art there can be a further stage after creation—the appreciation of the work by outsiders. And in some arts, music and the theatre, for instance, a transitional stage is needed in order to arrive at appreciation. It is about the status of this liaison that I disagree with Mr. Fallon. Perhaps he would not accept my definitions of the different functions of art. If he does not, we part company and according to my map he has gone down the road marked Error.

So that a work created for the theatre may be appreciated in its proper manner its action must be presented by actors. They must portray as living persons to the audience those characters which otherwise lie silent and fleshless in the lines of script. The actor makes the character certainly, but does he make it in the sense that a creative artist makes his work of art? Not at all, he re-creates the part from the material given him by the author. He is handed the matter he must present. Modify his voice, his manner, or his appearance as he may, he nevertheless must present the lines that he has received. He may not speak the lines he might wish had been written. That is not to say that acting is easy, that any tyro can give a good performance from the script alone, even with an experienced producer. On the contrary, the actor must have devoted effort and time to the attainment of proficiency. To be outstanding he must give his life to the study and understanding of how to portray all shades of emotion, sense and intention. It is arduous work, it is a noble profession to which the actor must give himself fully. But it is to the perfection of his craft that he gives himself, not to the practice of an art. As a sign-painter must be experienced and expert in his craft in order to carry out the intentions of those who commission his work, so must the actor be practised and proficient in his.

But as the sign-painter need not be an artist, though he may be, so also the actor does not need creative art to portray the intentions of the author.

But if the actor does not abide by the author's intentions, if he makes of the written words something different from what the author intended, is he not then truly creative? I would say "Yes" but I should question whether this is always permissible. A pianist friend of mine plays *Some day my Prince will come* from the Walt Disney film *Snow White*. He makes of it something lovely, something hauntingly suggestive of the beauty in sorrow. In his playing it is no longer the song of the film which he interprets, but his expression of the elements of the song as re-synthesised and moulded by his mind. He gives his own work of creative art, and the result is good. But if every instrumentalist insisted on playing his own creation from his score in the *Prelude de l'Après-Midi d'une Faune* what would be the effect? Would Debussy approve? Would the result be acceptable to the critics or to the average knowledgeable audience?

The late F. J. McCormick made of "Shields" a character which O'Casey had not intended. His portrayal was a work of creative art and the result was good. O'Casey, according to Mr. Fallon's quotation, was satisfied by getting better than he gave. Would not Mr. O'Casey, however, have been satisfied if "Shields" had been portrayed efficiently and accurately as he had conceived him, brought to life as the character he had intended? The character could have been satisfactorily presented by an accomplished craftsman as actor, whereas a different character was presented by a creative artist as actor.

Now when an author writes a play he writes it as a whole, made up of several parts bound together to form the structure of the idea he has conceived. He does not simply write a third-part report of some event. He gives the material for the living enactment of that event and this he does by a number of characters whose separate existences and actions must cohere in order to form the complete play. Each character is an entity distinct from any other, but every character is a part of the whole and each must support and complement the others to integrate this one whole. It is to this end that the artist has conceived the parts. A work of art is unitary.

Generally speaking the actor may not create from his lines a character different from that expressed by the author. The actor has

no licence except to present the re-creation of the writer's intention, because if he portrays the wit as a cynic, the shrewd merchant as a cunning opportunist or the clown as a fool, what becomes of artistic unity? If the actors do not present the parts given them to make the whole, where shall the playwright look for his play? If a production consists of a number of characters not merged together in a unified stream action, how will the audience value it as a play, and what will the critic think of it as art? To knit a Fairisle jumper, are the coloured wools employed as the spirit moves or are they used according to plan?

Any interpretation of a character must necessarily be modified by the physical, emotional and mental make-up of the actor taking the part, but in general it must conform to the author's idea. The foreman builder does not say to his men: "Here are some bricks. Dispose of them as you wish," but "Take these bricks and use them according to my plan." Some of them, being better craftsmen, will do better work than others, but all must follow the instructions within close limits. When an author gives his play he does not say: "Make of these lines what characters you choose," but he expects the actors to use them to produce his work. In effect, he says to the company: "If you want to produce my play, take it. But if you do not intend to produce it as mine, you have no right to corrupt it."

This is the general rule. The actor must serve the play, but he need not be a slave. He must walk under the yoke of the author, but the length of his stride may be his own. His technique must be good, he must use all his craft, he may interpret a part within limits but normally he may not create his own character. Among actors the creative artist may be as the apple tree among the trees of the wood, but his fruit will not always be sweet to our taste. If all trees were apple trees, what would the archer do for his bow or the sailors of old for the heart of oak?

If Mr. Fallon should read this, may he, from the height of his experience, regard it with the tolerance of a master for a neophyte. Probably, as suggested at the outset, my disagreement has been largely occasioned by a difference in interpretation of such terms as "creative art". Unfortunately this would not be the first misunderstanding to arise through the ambiguity of words for which the English language has so often been blamed. What is more (though not flattering to my pride), there may be facets of the subject which

have as yet reflected no light upon my intelligence. With the grace of God, some measure of truth must be attained by everyone who searches for it and perhaps Mr. Fallon would help me to see whether I have gone some way towards it, or whether it is I who have wandered down the road to Error through the mist of abstract theorising.

To turn aside for a moment before ending; there are some, I feel sure, from whom I can never expect agreement with my views, for it is fruitless to preach to the converted. I refer to those who, drawing profit or kudos from their connection with the theatre, seriously and with intent attempt to gull the common man and gain from him a respect and award they have not earned. A man engaged on important work gains importance from the work he does and it is human to seek to exalt the standing of one's job. The status of the creative artist is desired by many, for his *métier* stands out from the expanse of mundane avocations. He is envied because he is singular, apart from the common run of mankind and because of his liberty and the freedom from convention he so often claims in the furtherance of his self-realisation in the creation of his work. When acting is regarded as a creative art, those who practise it and those who deal with it will tend to be regarded more favourably by the community than those engaged in more common callings. It is to the advantage of those connected with the theatre to claim acting as a creative art. They benefit if their claims are accepted by the public, so rather than be content with a profession needing polished technique, skilled craftsmanship and interpretative art, they go forth and call to all that theirs is a creative art.

To assert that the moon is made of green cheese though you know it is not, may be odd but it will do no harm as you will not be believed. But, knowing the meaning of "creative art", to assert that an actor is necessarily a creative artist and to foist this assertion on those who do not understand that he need not be, is wrong and harmful. To claim as true something which you believe to be true is one thing and laudable; to claim as true something which you would like to be true is quite another and contemptible. When this is done to gain unmerited benefit it is akin to obtaining money by false pretences. It is fraud.

SOME RECENT BOOKS

APPROACH TO MYSTICISM

The Spear Of Gold. Revelations of the Mystics. Edited by H. A. Reinhold. 1947. London: Burns Oates. 16/- net.

The interest in mysticism in all its forms has increased much in recent years. For non-Catholics at least it was much stimulated by William James's famous Gifford Lectures *The Varieties of Religious Experience*. A Catholic would find a great deal—even the fundamental principles and positions—to object to in this breezy, stimulating book; but no one could deny that it directed general attention to a phenomenon of religion which is of the deepest significance. Since the publication of James's book a great deal of study has been given to this kind of super-rational knowledge or experience which is found in some form or other in most religions. Non-Catholics who do not understand the meaning of the supernatural or the nature and function of grace will confuse two kinds of this experience which are essentially different, the kind that is within the reach of the natural powers of man and the kind which demands absolutely the assistance of grace. But in spite of this grave confusion the growing study of mysticism is a feature of the general interest in religion which must be welcomed.

For Catholics, of course, mysticism or contemplation is one of the recognised features characteristic of their Faith; and every age from that of St. John the Evangelist and St. Paul to our own has added to that cloud of witnesses who have given testimony to an experience of God which they could not doubt and at the same time could not describe. Mystical theology has been since the days of the Pseudo-Dionysius a recognised branch of the general study of theology. In recent years the nature of mysticism and its conditions have become a subject of intense study and of rather acrid controversy. And as a result of this interest on the part of the theologians there has been published a steady flow of books on this subject for the ordinary Catholic, chiefly anthologies, whether drawn from a wide circle of mystics or from the works of individual mystics.

Fr. Reinhold's volume is not just another of these anthologies; it is a book of selections with a difference; and the difference is the

chief justification of his work. The usual anthology of this kind illustrates a few central features of the mystical life, but leaves that experience isolated from ordinary life. Fr. Reinhold's *The Spear Of Gold* aims at illustrating all the regular stages of the soul's progress from ordinary prayer to the highest stage of contemplation. The title of the book is taken from St. Teresa's description of the transverberation of her heart by an Angel with a spear of gold; and Velasquez' picture of the event is the frontispiece of the book. The compiler casts his net widely and pagans, poets, philosophers, theologians and religious teachers of all times and kinds figure in the book; but the main portion of the selections are from the classical mystics.

The Catholic will need to keep before his mind the principle already mentioned, that for genuine contact with the true living God divine grace is a necessity, and that consequently many of the passages from non-Catholic authors describe some initial purification of spirit or some intuition of reality or some exaltation of mind from a contact with nature which while very rare and outside the range of ordinary experience are still natural, and are achieved by the activity of the natural powers of the soul. The compiler has given this necessary warning in the brief and helpful introduction, and once it is kept in mind the Catholic can get only benefit from the book.

The Spear Of Gold is not a practical guide to mysticism. No one can become a mystic by reading about it. But the special value of the book is that it gives an orderly analysis of the movement or dynamic of the mystical life. What conditions it presupposes, what preparations, what purifications; what different forms it takes in different individuals or different races or ages; what virtue it fosters and displays; what are its mounting stages; these are some of the points illustrated by the selections. The book shows how extraordinarily complex mysticism is. In such a complex subject there is room for individual opinion and one might quarrel with some of Fr. Reinhold's detailed stages; one might, for example, expect a greater space to be given to the purifications of sense and soul which to St. John of the Cross are of such importance. But on the whole as a survey of the different aspects of a great complex subject, which are described in the words of the mystics themselves, the book is a valuable contribution to the subject.

—H. K.

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